RTFA: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/

Abstract Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems – BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt – using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.

WOW!!! AMAZING work. I was absolutely floored by the decompressed air trick. Check out the video.

RTFA: http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070523-rese…

“Last time, it took nine years for us to generalize from a special to
a nonspecial, hard-to-factor number,” Lenstra said in a statement, referring
to a 155-digit number that his team had broken previously. More recently,
a 200-digit non-special number was factored in 18 months and roughly 50 years
of computer time. This 307-digit crack took even less (human) time, which
Lenstra credits to more powerful computers and improved code. “I will
not make predictions [about the future of 1024-bit encryption], but let us
just say that it might be a good idea to stay tuned.”

Why does anyone care? While your average Joe or Jane on the street will not
be able to crack a 1024-bit RSA key anytime soon, experienced attackers might
not have such a hard time. Getting the computing power to crack a 1024-bit
key could be as easy as employing a decent-sized botnet
or two.

Someone clicked to RTFA after searching for “rsa bot net crack.” I saw that and realized it’s an insanely cool concept. Lo, the idea has been floated before.